Book review: The American Civil War

Authored by John Keegan (2009, ISBN 978-0-307-26343-8).

The subtitle is "A Military History", which indeed it is, given the sometimes numbing description of fronts moved and bodies killed, injured or missing. But, there might be military buffs out there who enjoy that sort of thing. I skimmed through those paragraphs to enjoy the remainder of the book, for one cannot talk about the Civil War without at least some mention of politics.

Keegan has high regard for Lincoln as a politician, speaker and military leader. Lincoln had no military experience prior to his assuming office, and he sometimes struggled too long with inept generals such as George McClellan before fixing on winners such as Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman. But, Lincoln eventually alighted on a cogent military strategy (the Anaconda plan); further, he settled on the achievable political goal of black freedom rather than the unachievable (at that time) goal of black equality, which was not something he believed personally. Lincoln sought to preserve the Union, end slavery, and cause as little damage as necessary in the process. Unfortunately, much damage was necessary.

The Civil War was easily America's deadliest: over 10,000 battles in four years of fighting saw 110,000 Union battle deaths and 94,000 Confederate. Double that number died from disease, a ratio that would hold in the First World War as well. Why did these soldiers continue to fight even after the consequences were known and abandonment was somewhat easy? Keegan's answer: "cause and comrades". In the early going Unionists eagerly signed up to preserve the Union and abolish slavery and Confederates to preserve states' rights. After initial losses it was hard to give up and say to oneself and fellows that the loss was wasted, much like a poker player who already has a substantial number of chips in the pot. This, despite speaking the same language as the "opponent" and the cases where brother fought brother. It was not uncommon, during lulls in action, for individual soldiers to meet halfway, Unionists with coffee in trade for Confederate tobacco.

Part of the reason for the large losses was a widely-held, mistaken belief before and during the early stages of the war: a single, definitive battle would substantially control the outcome. Why this should be believed was unclear. Our revolutionary battle against Britain started with a number of early American successes, followed by British victories as Britain hardened its thinking and tightened its approach, concluding with another reversal and ultimate patriot victory. Another reason flowed naturally from the Anaconda plan: naval blockade coupled with bisection of the South by controlling the Mississippi River. Within a couple of years the North had accomplished those goals, but the war dragged on for two more years. Anaconda was a brilliant approach to avoiding a Union loss, but because the Southern population spread so thinly, with no real strategic centers like Baltimore and Philadelphia in the North, the Confederacy would not capitulate until its armies reached near zero strength and, more importantly, the civilian population was destroyed by marching opposition forces.

Why did the fighting start at all? For one, on the Northern side, American tolerance of slavery caused genuine embarrassment, even if most Northerners did not see blacks as their equals. Few civilized countries allowed it (Britain prohibited it in 1833). And even though the U.S. in 1807 abolished the importation of slaves, due to reproduction the slave population grew from 1 million at that time to 4 million by 1861. The South had been using its equality in states (even if not in population) to exert influence in the Senate. The 1820 Missouri compromise provided that territories joining the U.S. north of 36 degrees, 30 minutes would be free. The South would lose its equality in the Senate as new free states joined the Union.

That calculation, plus a reluctance to lose the benefits the slave economy, at least on the part of wealthy Southerners, pushed the conflict to the brink. Slave ownership concentrated thinly at the top. Fewer than 1 in 100 Southerners owned twenty or more slaves. Most Southerners had nothing to gain from military confrontation and a lot to lose, namely the ability to run a subsistence farm. However, slave owners held most of the political power and seized on states' rights as a convenient ideology. The belief in states' rights was more than propaganda, Confederate politicians accepted it as true. That belief hampered their war efforts. While in the North the entire military effort was controlled by Washington, Richmond in the South exercised only influence. States formed their own militias in large part to protect state, not Confederate, interests.

It is a wonder the war lasted as long as it did, given the North's outward military superiority. Its industrial output was as large as any nation's; its industrial centers were out of reach of Southern forces; it retained international recognition as the true American sovereign and the trade and credit that came with that recognition; its had access to professional money management, critical to funneling food and supplies across long lines.

When comparing personnel no obvious victor emerges. Robert E. Lee of the South was the pre-eminent general and the North suffered under bunglers until Lincoln's discovery of Grant and Sherman. Neither side had a trained force at the ready. The Southern soldier perhaps showed more grit and resourcefulness -- it was the South that invented the first workable submarine for river battles. Union soldiers had plenty of food; Confederate somewhat less but able to rely on the land. On the political side, the Confederate president Jefferson Davis, a former senator and secretary of war, was no match for Lincoln. Davis was elegant and refined but lacked Lincoln's gift with people.

The Confederacy banked on its stranglehold of the cotton trade to bring about recognition from Europe. No recognition came, though, for three reasons. First, Britain had sufficient stocks of cotton for its processing mills at the outbreak of war. Second, the British detested slavery. Third, the North's successfully encircled the South with a blockade.

Black soldiers in the Union army make great stories, but the reality was more mundane. The Union feared using blacks because of racism and because of the supposed vigor it might instill in Confederate forces; in no case were they integrated (no army units were integrated until the 1950s). Blacks did not join the armed forces until late in the war, and they were poorly led and tentatively fielded. Further, while some were undoubtedly sought retribution against white Southerners, a good number were also too afraid to fight effectively (capture or mere separation could mean death, or worse). So, while some black units achieved glory, the overall impact of blacks on the Union military effort scarcely differed from that of whites.

I had not given any thought to the notion that while the Union cleaved into North and South, and many states were firmly in one camp (such as Massachusetts) or the other (such as Mississippi). In places like Tennessee, Kansas and especially Missouri, public opinion divided sharply. As fighting started between the Union and Confederacy, so to did fighting start in Missouri, with Unionists in the Northern sections being driven from their homes. At the same time, Jayhawkers (abolitionists from Kansas) attacked secessionists in Western Missouri. The conclusion of these localized hostilities: a Union state, but secessionist elements who were admitted to the Confederate Congress.

Similarly, I had not given any thought to the motivations of John Wilkes Booth, Lincoln's assassin. I came of age when a mentally unstable Hinckley shot President Ronald Reagan without political motivation and thought that must have been the case with Lincoln as well. My belief was odd, given my familiarity with Archduke Franz Ferdinand and World War I. Booth was 27 years of age and a financially successful actor. He was also a fanatic confederate and a member of a gang whose purpose was to assassinate Union leaders. They had plotted for months before the attack and Union forces were chasing them. Booth entered the theater, shot Lincoln, jumped to the stage, broke his leg, but managed to mount his horse and flee. For twelve days he moved from house to house until cornered by Unionists. He refused to concede, the forces set on fire the building that held him and shot into the fire, killing him. Another of the gang was assigned the task of killing Vice-President Andrew Jackson, but that member lost his nerve.

Race relations in America would have perhaps been much different had he not. The President Jackson only thinly disguised his racism. Reconstruction was never intended for the South, but was considered for the North. Nothing like a Marshall Plan was considered, and in the end little was done. A plan would have been helpful to newly freed Northern blacks, who had their freedom but little else. Jackson's antipathy ensured it would stay that way, as would various stratagems to deny from Southern blacks in practice what was rightfully theirs by law. In the South, where many landless blacks remained, no work was available except farming and sharecropping some former master's land.

The battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in the Summer of 1963 was a turning point in the war. 64,000 Confederates under General Lee faced 99,000 Union fighters under General Lee, who had been maneuvering his men for months in the hopes of pushing into Northern territory. Each side lost approximately 23,000 men and, as Lee was unable to push through, counted as a Union victory; 46,000 dead in a few days' fighting.

Four months later notable Northern leaders gathered to dedicate the Soldiers' National Cemetery in Gettysburg. Lincoln was second to speak on the program, after music and prayer and a two-hour, prepared-script speech by former Massachusetts senator Edward Everett. Lincoln spoke his three paragraphs in two minutes. Among the many things Lincoln accomplished with that speech, his refusal to differentiate between the sacrifices given by North and South sped the nation's healing.