With this post I review the book originally authored by Peter Mansfield in 1991 and revised and updated by Nicolas Pelham in 2003 (ISBN 0 14 30.3433 2).
My interest in the Middle East stems from several sources: the seemingly-intractable problems of today; its role in the oil industry (the subject of The Prize by Daniel Yergin); Islam; and the Ottoman empire. One movie I distinctly remember as a child was "Lawrence of Arabia".
My inescapable conclusion: what a mess Britain made! The French tried as hard as the British to make a mess, but were less successful, and so less blameworthy. The U.S. arrived later than the British, with more wisdom (presumably as a result of observing what the British did) and its impact has been close to neutral.
Of course, much of the blame could be directed to Mr. Osman, progenitor of the Ottoman empire in the 1300s. He and his offspring were successful invaders and conquerors and, importantly, relatively wise rulers, collecting taxes and imposing their will and spreading Islam but doing so gently enough to cause the ruled to choose submission rather than fighting to the death. Over time, though, their territory grew too large, their rulers too weak and indulgent, and their empire collapsed towards the end of World War I.
The causes of the Ottoman decline were external and internal. Internally, Bayezid I succeeded his father Murad in 1389, and upon assumption of power he ordered the strangulation of one of his rivals: his brother. The practice of murdering rivals both within the family and without continued with successive rulers, setting up intrigue upon intrigue as mothers tried to preserve the lives of their sons. More damaging, though, was the practice of secluding the heir apparent so that his life could be spared until his turn to assume power. This seclusion had the effect of physically and mentally weakening the one person the empire should turn to.
Externally the British and Portuguese emerged from the Dark Ages with powerful fleets that established bases throughout the Ottoman world. And, whereas earlier Muslim civilizations both contributed to and borrowed from contemporary Christian civilizations, the Turkish Ottomans showed little inclination to share, secure in the knowledge that Muslim ways were superior. And in Egypt, a prize because of its fertile Nile valley and its strategic position straddling the Mediterranean and Red Seas, the Ottomans had struggled with local forces for a long time and then, in 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte viewed Egypt as a counterbalance to British power in India, and although we was ultimately unsuccessful in Egypt, his exploits focused Western attention on Egypt.
The story of Muhammad Ali in Egypt played out similarly to many contested domains. The Ottomans, the Malmuke beys, and Muhammad Ali all struggled for power. The Ottomans decided to cut their losses by naming him as the Ottoman governor. While nominally under the Sultan's direction, he had substantial discretion because of his independent power base. And, in a pattern that was to play out repeatedly by other rulers, he established his power by a combination of ruthlessness and sensibility, using brutal means to suppress dissension but also wise economic policies to maximize the productivity of an already fertile nation. Thus he was able to prevail for some time against the array of uncoordinated forces opposing him: the French, the British, the Russians, and the beys in the countryside.
The Ottoman empire did not consistently, for its six-hundred-plus years of existence, remain fixed in time. Although consistently trailing European technology, Sultan Abdul Mejid I, born in 1839 and ascending to the throne sixteen years later, undertook reforms which substantially changed the empire. The changes included a non-Sharia-based code of law, including the concept of equality before the law of all Ottoman citizens; the opening of new military schools, using foreign instructors; the reduction to five years, from a lifetime, of required military service; and the establishment of a centralized network of primary and secondary schools (to that time, all schools were religious). Unfortunately, these reforms and military expenditures to keep pace with European armaments, were expensive. To meet the empire's financial needs the Sultan expanded trade; while revenues increased, much of the benefit accrued to foreigners; he also issued bonds, increasing inflation.
As trade increased an young Ottomans circulated more, they became aware of their empire's backwardness. They were also none too happy with the continued existence of The Capitulations, policies adopted during the height of the empire's power that, in an effort to stimulate trade and industry, exempted foreigners from taxes and laws. Frustration and embarrassment led many of these young people to organize the first revolutionary bodies.
As the empire weakened forces in Europe, and Russia, saw their opportunity to exert more influence over lands formerly firmly, but now only nominally, under Ottoman rule. Yet, all were careful not to push too far, as are were interested in the buffer and stabilizing force of a weakened, rather than non-existent, empire.
In 1854 the new leader of Egypt, Said, embarked to borrow large sums from European banks to finance the building of the Suez Canal (a waterway from the Mediterranean to the Red Seas). The project was headed by Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps. By 1869 the canal was completed, and by 1875 Egypt, nearly bankrupt from this expenditure (and others, including the laying of train track and telegraph cables), sold its interest in the Canal to Britain. And, Britain borrowed from private banks as well to finance the sale. Colonel Ahmed Arabi of the Egyptian army came to power as the voice of the military and fellahin, Egyptian workers oppressed by the high taxes necessary to make debt payments on the Canal. Britain and France objected and insisted on the return to power of the Ottoman khedive. This position further inflamed Egyptian public opinion; Britain and France sent a fleet sailing down the Mediterranean and posted it outside Alexandria. Riots broke out, resulting in some fifty dead Europeans. The fleet shelled the city, flattening it. British forces landed, killing ten thousand Egyptian soldiers at a cost of 57. Britain, never seriously intending offensive action or occupation, found itself in that position. It ruled nominally, with Lord Cromer "advising" an Ottoman khedive; Britain was most interested in preserving the Suez Canal and the overland links through Egypt and to India. Cromer, following the feelings of many Britons, lever bothered to learn Arabic in his 24 years of service in Egypt. To his credit, though, he engineered the construction of the Aswan damn and oversaw a government that was more effective and less corrupt than the Ottoman one he replaced.
During the 18th and early 19th centuries the Ottoman empire shrank but still covered the "Arab heartland", such as Medina, Mecca, Jerusalem and Baghdad. But its hold varied, and in many places it ruled because it was at the moment barely stronger than any competing power, rather than because it was effective. Abdul Hamid's rule ended in 1908 with the rise of the Committee for Union and Progress ("CUP"), led by Enver Bey, Jemal Pasha and the future Kemal Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal. The CUP, with brutality matching that of the government it deposed, attempted to "Turkify" portions of the Ottoman empire, especially Istanbul, to the bother of Ottoman Arabs.
Contemporaneously with the developments in the Ottoman empire the House of Saud, led by Ibn Saud, fought for control of Arabia with the Nejd, led by Sharif Hussein, who cooperated with the Ottomans when it suited him. The Saudis, following their fierce Wahhabi (Muslim) faith, saw little to admire in the Ottomans and did not cooperate, even where it might have suited them politically or militarily.
Few Westerners are familiar with the differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. The differences are historical and political, not religious, and concern the proper succession from the prophet Muhammad. The Ottomans were Sunnis, and the Persians (Iranians) were Shiites, and they battle for control of Mesopotamia (roughly modern-day Iraq) for two hundred years before the Ottomans secured a fragile victory.
Europeans were also interested in these lands, and Russian wars with Persia generally went in Russia's favor, yielding it land, money, capitulations, and free-trade agreements. In 1907 the British and Russians agreed to partition Persia, in a sense, with Russia's sphere of influence covering the North and center and the British the Southeast. At first glance the British portion was inferior, but owing to a 60-year oil concession the Shah granted to William Knox D'Arcy in 1901. He struck nothing at first, and was about to leave; the British Navy pined for a non-Russian and non-American source of oil, and supported D'Arcy until he struck one of the largest oil fields in the world, in Southeastern Persia in 1908.
With the start of World War I the Ottomans had to choose between neutrality, supporting the Germans, or supporting the Allies. They choose the Germans, which in hindsight was a poor choice. As the Ottomans were falling to the Allies the British and French divided the Middle East into spheres of influence with the Sykes-Picot agreement: to France would go Lebanon and Syria and to England Iraq and Transjordan. The French were interested in protecting Christians in Syria; the British were most concerned with access to India via the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Arabia. The agreement said nothing about Palestine. But, in addition to this agreement was the Balfour declaration, authored by the British foreign secretary:
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and ill use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done with may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
At the time Palestine was largely Arab and controlled by the Ottomans; a small Jewish population existed. The declaration encouraged Jewish immigration and over time the population grew in size, influence and power. The Zionists (Jews interested in political power, rather than mere religious freedom) proved more sophisticated, better funded (from Europe and the United States) and more violent than the resident Arabs, leading to their establishment of Israel in 1948. The Balfour declaration has caused, at least in part, ninety years of bloodshed, with perhaps another ninety waiting. In fairness to the British, though, this portion of the world has not enjoyed much peace, at least according to the Bible.
At the conclusion of World War I the Ottoman empire had ceased. What was formerly dominion over much of the Arab world was now present day Turkey, a country more Turk than Arab. The remainder of the former empire consisted of tribes, not nation-states, which explains the difficulties the West has encountered ever since. The United States, under president Wilson, preferred to give native inhabitants more input. Britain and France, having more interests (read: colonies), preferred consulting and advice: a nominal nation-state under the "advice" of a European power. Neither approach seems justified in hindsight, given that no nation-state existed before the Ottomans rose to power 500 years ago. The evaporation of the Ottomans did not, therefore, leave an intact people thankful to be free. It left dozens of tribes and power centers and vested interests that were not amenable to central government, whether that government was directed by natives or Europeans.
The British and France also exercised their influence with the League of Nations to divide what was then known as Syria into French Lebanon, French Syria, British Palestine and British Transjordan; Iraq went to Britain, too. The Arabs fought with bullets against these arrangements but were no match for European planes and tanks.
Just as the British and French jostled for power the Arabs did, too, with Ibn Saud wielding his Wahhabi warriors and capturing the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, though the warriors were too independent to take direct orders and ventured beyond his mandate and incurred heavy losses. The British ended their various subsidies to Arab rulers they no longer had use for.
In Egypt the British ruled, or nearly ruled, over an unruly land they did not want to rule. Britain nevertheless feared the various parties that might fill the vacuum created if they were to leave. The British authorities on the ground therefore backed whatever Egyptian leader seemed most capable and most compliant, not necessarily in that order. Their continued presence, however, continued to irritate the citizens and was routinely used by politicians not in power to criticize those who were.
The first oil in commercial quantities was discovered in Iran; later, oil was found in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. at this time, producing more oil than it could use from wells in Pennsylvania, Texas and California, pursued a largely isolationist strategy, with the exception of insisting on the right of any party (especially American) to bid on shares of concessions. These concessions generally called for an up-front payment by the developed country to the undeveloped country, with continuing payments based on the amount of oil extracted and its price. The Arab and Persian countries at this time were desperately poor and lacked the technical acumen to extract and refine the oil themselves. Over the years, as the price of oil increased, the oil countries insisted on larger and larger portions of the profits, until at varying times they simply seized the equipment and booted the Western interests.
With the outbreak of World War II both Iran and Egypt were pressured to take sides. Neither had strong sympathies in either direction, and at the start of the war the relative strength of the fighters was unknown. Both, therefore, took moderate approaches, although both generally fell on the side of the Allies, the Allies were able to push Axis forces from Egypt and Iran just before the Axis powers seized those areas in their entirety. Russia and Britain took spheres of interest in Iran.
At the conclusion of World War II Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and Syria agitated for independence. This was fine with the British but not the French, who arrested the winners of elections and bombed Damascus when violence erupted. The French eventually capitulated in 1946, and Syria and Lebanon joined the United Nations.
From that time the nations with substantial Arab or Muslim populations, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc., now substantially freed from Western domination, struggled to define themselves. Were they Arabs with a shared religion or Muslims with shared geography? The conflicts between the Wahhabi and Hashemite, and between Sunni and Shi'a, have meant that even with the Arab League and OPEC and various other organizations designed to promote unity, these nations do not speak with one voice, any more than the United States and France, though close allies, speak as one. And indeed, a substantial source of conflict in these Middle Eastern countries arises when the secularists in power do not seem sufficiently attentive to the religious elements in the population. The reverse of this situation exists in Iran, where religious elements hold control and the population, who consider themselves more Western than Arab, regret the constrictions on their lives. One irony is that Ayatollah Khomeini's most serious opposition when he seized power in 1979 sprung not from the population, who probably support any type of Iranian victory over the megalomaniacal Shah, but from religious clerics who questioned his spiritual authority
The out-sized personality of Saddam Hussein must figure prominently in any account of Middle Eastern history. With the Iranian revolution, Iran's broadcast of pro-Shi'a messages into Iragi airwaves, alarmed Hussein. Hussein decided to act first, deciding that although Iran was larger and more heavily-resourced, a surprise move could be successful against the demoralized Iranian military. And, he was initially successful militarily and politically. His forces pushed deep into Iran while most Arab states quietly supported him with statements and materials. But, Iran eventually gained the upper hand, pushed Iraq's forces back, and the war ended eight years later after many deaths and hardly any change in borders.
While Arab sentiment during this war was directed more against Iran than in favor of Hussein, he misunderstood that dynamic and shortly after the conclusion of that war announced Kuwait would "rejoin its mother" by becoming the 19th Iraqi province. Never mind that Kuwait existed two centuries before Iraq's birth as a British governmental convenience. World opinion, led by the first President Bush, formed against him, and his forces were routed as they fled Kuwait, but not before they inflicted grotesque damages to Kuwaiti oilfields, souring the environment for months.
America's success in Kuwait and the implosion of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s left the United States as the unquestioned Superpower, and it used that power, and helped establish that power, but creating semi-permanent military installations in Kuwait; by monitoring, for years, no-fly zones over large portions of Iraq; by enforcing the oil-for-food program; and by sponsoring and prodding UNSCOM to search for weapons of mass destruction inside Iraq. There were limits, however. Despite the first President Bush's outspoken desire for regime change in Iraq, when Shiites and Kurds did rise the United States provided no material support, and Hussein brutally suppressed them.
It was the Iraqi people who suffered when Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with the U.S.-led coalition on the oil-for-food program. During this time Hussein had the audacity to allow Iraqi TV to broadcast images from his birthday party to the Iraqi population, including his cutting of the cake, at a time when most Iraqis had not seen sugar in months. Unfortunately for the U.S., most Arab countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, took a dim view of the U.S.-led embargo, and quietly but determinedly established their own relationships with Iraq. At the same time, public opinion of the U.S. in these countries dropped, fueled by the suffering and the indulgence the U.S. showed Israel as it, too, ignored those U.N. resolutions it disagreed with.
In 1993 the Israeli Labour Party took power and its leader, Yitzhak Rabin, reached out to Yasser Arafat. After months of negotiations hosted by Norway, the Oslo accords announced a seismic shift: Israel would give back territory it had won in previous wars and the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist. The trades were to be consummated years in the future. By 1995 most of the world had accepted the agreement. Rabin's Israeli assassin did not, however. His actions encouraged extremist Jews to murder Muslims and for Hamas to terrorize Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and for the spiral of millenia of violence to continue. To this day the momentum from the Oslo accords has not been regained.
One cannot judge certain cultures as being superior to others, but in one sphere the Arab world lags the Western: democracy. Much of the Arab world is on its second or third generation of kings, sons or grandsons of the original rulers from the post World War I or II periods. Unlike the earliest generation these men have grown up in luxury and with education, but see it as necessary they rule their countries with an iron fist. In what has been an alliance of questionable morality, the U.S. can count on these leaders to speak against revolutionary activity in any country for fear the same will happen in the ones they rule.
Finally, author Pelham turns to the current day. He writes, and I have felt for some time, that so-called Muslim extremists are not Muslims. They are extremists who use Islam as a coordinating and rallying force. The Koran (of which I have read two-thirds) has small sections advocating violence, but it focuses on instruction for God-fearing and neighborly living. The Old Testament is extremely violent, and the New Testament somewhat aggressive. The Israeli student who murdered Yitzhak Rabin and spurred a cycle of violence that has killed hundreds and make homeless thousands declared himself a Jew. That man was no more a Jew than Osama Bin Laden is a Muslim.
Monday, August 30, 2010
Book review: Drive
Daniel H. Pink wrote "Drive" in 2007.
Mr. Pink attempts to explain what motivates us, and he starts by explaining what does not motivate us, or at least, no longer motivates us. Starting at the turn of the previous century, with the coming of the industrial revolution, business leaders recognized that much industrial work was not inherently rewarding, and so set up systems to reward good behavior (more widgets per hour) and punish bad behavior (sleeping on the job). These systems persist to this day, even though the kind of work many of us do is no longer "algorithmic" (following a set of steps to arrive at a finished product or service). Many of us perform "heuristic" work that requires creativity to arrive at an optimal, or at least satisfactory, solution. Think: advertising campaign.
It turns out that the reward/punishment model does not work so well here and, in fact, it can be counter-productive. He calls examples from research and from literature.
He summarized a study with children that presented play opportunities, one of which was drawing. The researchers separated the children into three groups; the first received no recognition or praise for drawing with crayons. The second received certificates after drawing, but were not told at the start of the certificates. The third group was told at the start that they would receive a certificate. Two weeks later the children were invited back; the researchers measured the portion from each group that drew in the first session and drew in this later session. The third group, the one with the announced reward, sported the lowest number of returning artists.
Another research study concluded that paying for blood will result in fewer collections than relying on donations.
Still other researchers followed a day care center and observed parent punctuality after the center imposed a fee for retrieving a child late. Parents were less punctual, not more, after that policy change. However, as I read this summary, it seemed to me that if the fine had been high enough they tardiness would decrease, or revenues would increase, or possibly both.
The literary example comes from Mark Twain. Mr. Pink reminds us of a vignette from "Tom Sawyer" where Huckleberry Finn is assigned the task of applying whitewash to a fence. He feigns interest in the task, causing his friends to become interested. They ask if they can help, Huckleberry Finn refuses. Only after after they give him something of value does Huck relent; the friends apply and re-apply the whitewash and Huck gathers many treasures. He regrets that he ran out of whitewash, and states: "Work consists of those things a body has to do, play consists of those things a body wants to do."
Pink recommends rewards in the "now that" form, rather than "if-then". "If-then" leads to the children's art scenario described above, while "now-that" rewards, such as "now that the team has successfully finished the project the company will treat for lunch, reinforces the intrinsic rewards the team members felt.
Parallel to the division between type A and type B people, Pink posits type I and type X people. While acknowledging that everyone will have elements of both types in their personalities, type I people seek intrinsic rewards and those of type X seeks extrinsic rewards. He claims that, over the long-term, the type I person is more productive than the type X person in the office; he does not explain how he knows this. And certainly, while intrinsic rewards can motivate people, there are a lot of slackers out there.
Mr. Pink attempts to explain what motivates us, and he starts by explaining what does not motivate us, or at least, no longer motivates us. Starting at the turn of the previous century, with the coming of the industrial revolution, business leaders recognized that much industrial work was not inherently rewarding, and so set up systems to reward good behavior (more widgets per hour) and punish bad behavior (sleeping on the job). These systems persist to this day, even though the kind of work many of us do is no longer "algorithmic" (following a set of steps to arrive at a finished product or service). Many of us perform "heuristic" work that requires creativity to arrive at an optimal, or at least satisfactory, solution. Think: advertising campaign.
It turns out that the reward/punishment model does not work so well here and, in fact, it can be counter-productive. He calls examples from research and from literature.
He summarized a study with children that presented play opportunities, one of which was drawing. The researchers separated the children into three groups; the first received no recognition or praise for drawing with crayons. The second received certificates after drawing, but were not told at the start of the certificates. The third group was told at the start that they would receive a certificate. Two weeks later the children were invited back; the researchers measured the portion from each group that drew in the first session and drew in this later session. The third group, the one with the announced reward, sported the lowest number of returning artists.
Another research study concluded that paying for blood will result in fewer collections than relying on donations.
Still other researchers followed a day care center and observed parent punctuality after the center imposed a fee for retrieving a child late. Parents were less punctual, not more, after that policy change. However, as I read this summary, it seemed to me that if the fine had been high enough they tardiness would decrease, or revenues would increase, or possibly both.
The literary example comes from Mark Twain. Mr. Pink reminds us of a vignette from "Tom Sawyer" where Huckleberry Finn is assigned the task of applying whitewash to a fence. He feigns interest in the task, causing his friends to become interested. They ask if they can help, Huckleberry Finn refuses. Only after after they give him something of value does Huck relent; the friends apply and re-apply the whitewash and Huck gathers many treasures. He regrets that he ran out of whitewash, and states: "Work consists of those things a body has to do, play consists of those things a body wants to do."
Pink recommends rewards in the "now that" form, rather than "if-then". "If-then" leads to the children's art scenario described above, while "now-that" rewards, such as "now that the team has successfully finished the project the company will treat for lunch, reinforces the intrinsic rewards the team members felt.
Parallel to the division between type A and type B people, Pink posits type I and type X people. While acknowledging that everyone will have elements of both types in their personalities, type I people seek intrinsic rewards and those of type X seeks extrinsic rewards. He claims that, over the long-term, the type I person is more productive than the type X person in the office; he does not explain how he knows this. And certainly, while intrinsic rewards can motivate people, there are a lot of slackers out there.
Monday, August 16, 2010
Book review: The New Korea
With this post I review The New Korea: An Inside Look at South Korea's Economic Rise, by Myung Oak Kim and Sam Jaffe.
I noted after reading that the authors are right up the street from me in Evergreen, Colorado.
This book attracted me for two closely-related reasons. First, I have never read a book about Korea and one of my personal goals is to expand my body of knowledge. Second, Korea is rarely mentioned outside of the Korean War, and I wondered why this was so.
The book speaks directly to my second reason: Korea has the world's fifteenth largest (!) economy, yet its "brand" ranks 33rd in name recognition. The Lee Myung-bak administration, in power since 2008, has launched a program to bring that rank up to 15. The reason given for Korea's relatively poor ranking is its cultural bias against outside influences. In the United States business people are generally willing to provide introductions to other business people. Cold-calling, while often unpleasant for the caller and the callee, is an accepted business practice that occasionally results in sales. In Korea, it is virtually impossible to make contact with a new business without a personal introduction from an insider. This practice extends to government; the authors complained about the government's unwillingness to provide helpful information while they were writing this book. Given this cultural bias, Korea's name recognition is not surprising. It is sometimes said that "there is no such thing as bad publicity". Plainly, Koreans do not believe that to be true.
The book devotes two chapters to North Korea (the bulk of the book speaks to South Korea, which is called simply "Korea"). Three things were of particular interest to me was:
1) Westerners have trouble understanding the negotiations between North and South because Korean culture views any negotiation as long-term, very long term. Imagine negotiating of the price of a car. As the authors put it,r
2) Moving from Mexico to the United States is trivial compared with the effort necessary to move from North to South Korea. Needless to say, given the heavy fortifications between the North and South one cannot try to run across. And, the book does not mention bribery as an option at this border. The other countries bordering North Korea are China and (a small sliver of) Russia. The book does not mention Russia as a possible destination. To get from North Korea to China requires bribing a border guard (unclear whether this is a Chinese or North Korean guard) or running undetected over a frozen Yalu River (the same Yalu River that MacArthur unfortunately decided he should cross during the Korean War). Should you be detected running across the river you will be shot in the face by the Chinese, shot in the back by the North Koreans, or apprehended by the North Koreans so that they may hang you in front of your family. Assuming one arrives in China safely, one faces years of waiting there until one can find a (reputable) smuggler to arrive in Laos or Cambodia. While waiting, citizens of China can collect a $100 honorarium (about a month's salary) for exposing you to the police. During this time employment opportunities are scarce; women face additional risks of sexual exploitation. Even after making it to South Korea you are treated as an outsider; even though you are of the same ethnic stock as the natives, you are usually identifiable by your stature, a few inches shorter because of typical malnutrition in the North.
3) China is sensitive to North Korean emigration. A few people here-or-there is of no concern, but China (and for that matter, the rest of the world, excepting North Korean citizens) prefers a stable North Korea.
The U.S. and South Korea are nominally allies, but excepting the demilitarized zone they have few shared interests. South Korea is another low-cost, high-quality competitor to U.S. industry.
Three chapters cover specific companies: Hyundai (automobiles), Samsung (just about everything imaginable) and LG (mostly electronics and machines). I found these chapters the slowest, but I was struck by how hard the Korean people are described as working and also struck by the large role of the government in industry: providing funds and picking winners and losers. The U.S. does not profess to operate this way, though how it actually operates is rumored to be different than the professed method. The Korean word chaebol parallels the Japanese word keiretsu, both meaning official government sanction and support for certain large conglomerates. The Korean version started after the Korean War, whereas the Japanese version started 200 years ago. Korea officially abandoned its support of such conglomerates ten years ago, though the conglomerates continue to pressure the government to resume the support.
Korea is wired, via cables and radio waves. By 2000, 9 of 10 Koreans had high-speed internet access, and such access is nearly universal today. Subway commuters watching TV on handheld device is a common sight. Again government intervention is common, in large part responsible for these successes and others in memory chips and wireless phones. On the other hand, the Korean government pushed satellite TV hard, launching in 2005, but never succeeding, in large part because Koreans already had terrific access to content via high-speed internet.
The remainder of the book spoke to Korean culture and predictions for the future. It is a we-focused culture, as opposed to a Western me-focus. In the office that means everyone arrives at work at the same time (early). Everyone eats in the cafeteria. Workers compete to leave the office latest. Every feels pressure to drink alcohol to oblivion. Subordinates are subservient to superiors, rarely offering opinions or feedback. Promotions are largely based on age. Unions are weak. All of this sounds unpleasant to the Western ear, yet there are (at least) two redeeming features. One, they work hard and accomplish a lot. The Korean war ended in 1953, with the country in shambles, and in 57 years Korea has vaulted to the 15th largest economy. Two, the Confucian principles that require subservience to elders also requires elders to take seriously their mentorship roles.
I found the Koreans' obsession with golf humorous. I view gold as Mark Twain did: "A good walk ruined". The sport is seen as prestigious, and a good way to cement business relationships. Successful Korean golfers on the PGA or LPGA are viewed as national heroes. All this in a tiny country where land is scarce.
In much the way the U.S. is a magnet for young workers from Latin America, Korea is a magnet for young workers from Southeast Asia with minimal prospects in the native lands. Korea was nearly homogeneous, and is still largely so, but the influx of non-Koreans brings the same pressures, problems and benefits that immigration yields here.
The book described childhood for some Koreans as unpleasant. Students compete fiercely for the best three schools, as attendance assures membership in an elite social crowd, and as explained above relationships in Korean business are critical to success. The book describes Yoo-bin, a five-year-old girl, as attending a $1,000/month English preschool at age four. At age five she started one-on-one tutoring. Now seven, she attends elementary school during the day and hakwon in the evenings. Every year all high school seniors take the college entrance test on the same day. On that day the non-seniors stay home so as not to distract. Businesses close or shift hours to clear road traffic; airlines re-route planes and the military delays exercises. Taxi drivers provide free rides and parking near the school is outlawed. Nearly 100% of students graduate high school and Korea ranks near the top countries in student achievement. On the other hand, families limit the number of children so as to concentrate their financial resources; Korea is aging rapidly as a result.
As modern as Korea is becoming, many Korean women seem to be stuck in the 50s. When Hillary Clinton visited, during the question-and-answer session with elite female high-school students she was asked about her relationship will Bill and her experiences raising Chelsea and nothing about foreign policy. Women make 64.2 cents for every dollar that a man makes in a similar position.
What can we expect from North Korea, other than the unexpected? Perhaps another war, perhaps started by North Korea with no warning. The most reasonable strategy would be a full-scale push, with the hope of capturing substantially all of South Korean territory before the U.S.-led or -supported troops mobilize. North Korea's Air Force consists of planes from the 1960s operated by airmen with about twenty hours of training (U.S. airmen cannot fly combat missions without 600 hours of in-flight training). The scariest prospect is the North's presumed/estimated possession of six nuclear weapons. And, what would China think, and do? China is interested in stability to its South, first, and no elevation in U.S. power in the region. Hopefully, the U.S. and China have already discussed the issue.
Perhaps the North Korean regime will collapse, as has been predicted since the 1950s. By whatever method (army, intelligence agencies, Korean Workers Party) chaos could very well ensue as Northerners attempt to flee to the South. Southern forces might move into the North to provide stability, but some elements of the North's military forces might object.
Perhaps the countries might peacefully re-unify. Already, the two countries have established a shared industrial zone on the border. More than 30,000 North Koreans work for South Korean managers, earning more than they could in the North, even after the North Korean government takes it cut. For the South, even that wage is considerably less than what would be paid in the South. Is this, then, just cheap immigrant labor?
Or, perhaps nothing will change, with the North behaving erratically and the South paying hush money.
Besides its relationship with the North, one of the South's most pressing issues is energy. It possesses few domestic sources of energy and its manufacturing economy is particularly reliant on cheap energy. Korea currently generates 20% of its electrical needs from nuclear power, not enough of its energy budget to protect against increasing oil costs. The authors urge Korea to devote more resources to wind energy, both for domestic consumption and as a technology to be sold abroad; they are especially enthusiastic about Korea's opportunity here, given its past successes with automobile and electronics manufacturing.
I noted after reading that the authors are right up the street from me in Evergreen, Colorado.
This book attracted me for two closely-related reasons. First, I have never read a book about Korea and one of my personal goals is to expand my body of knowledge. Second, Korea is rarely mentioned outside of the Korean War, and I wondered why this was so.
The book speaks directly to my second reason: Korea has the world's fifteenth largest (!) economy, yet its "brand" ranks 33rd in name recognition. The Lee Myung-bak administration, in power since 2008, has launched a program to bring that rank up to 15. The reason given for Korea's relatively poor ranking is its cultural bias against outside influences. In the United States business people are generally willing to provide introductions to other business people. Cold-calling, while often unpleasant for the caller and the callee, is an accepted business practice that occasionally results in sales. In Korea, it is virtually impossible to make contact with a new business without a personal introduction from an insider. This practice extends to government; the authors complained about the government's unwillingness to provide helpful information while they were writing this book. Given this cultural bias, Korea's name recognition is not surprising. It is sometimes said that "there is no such thing as bad publicity". Plainly, Koreans do not believe that to be true.
The book devotes two chapters to North Korea (the bulk of the book speaks to South Korea, which is called simply "Korea"). Three things were of particular interest to me was:
1) Westerners have trouble understanding the negotiations between North and South because Korean culture views any negotiation as long-term, very long term. Imagine negotiating of the price of a car. As the authors put it,r
[T]he North Koren approach is to wait for the first move by the seller of the car, then to douse the car in gasoline, set it afire, and make a counteroffer.
The buyer (South Korea) makes an initial offer publicly. Then it privately ... offers to actually provide ten times the amount for the car and to throw in ten more free cars to make up for the seller's ... loss.And, while it may seem demeaning to the South to act in this fashion, many from the South secretly admire those from the North who are willing to sacrifice so much for so little.
2) Moving from Mexico to the United States is trivial compared with the effort necessary to move from North to South Korea. Needless to say, given the heavy fortifications between the North and South one cannot try to run across. And, the book does not mention bribery as an option at this border. The other countries bordering North Korea are China and (a small sliver of) Russia. The book does not mention Russia as a possible destination. To get from North Korea to China requires bribing a border guard (unclear whether this is a Chinese or North Korean guard) or running undetected over a frozen Yalu River (the same Yalu River that MacArthur unfortunately decided he should cross during the Korean War). Should you be detected running across the river you will be shot in the face by the Chinese, shot in the back by the North Koreans, or apprehended by the North Koreans so that they may hang you in front of your family. Assuming one arrives in China safely, one faces years of waiting there until one can find a (reputable) smuggler to arrive in Laos or Cambodia. While waiting, citizens of China can collect a $100 honorarium (about a month's salary) for exposing you to the police. During this time employment opportunities are scarce; women face additional risks of sexual exploitation. Even after making it to South Korea you are treated as an outsider; even though you are of the same ethnic stock as the natives, you are usually identifiable by your stature, a few inches shorter because of typical malnutrition in the North.
3) China is sensitive to North Korean emigration. A few people here-or-there is of no concern, but China (and for that matter, the rest of the world, excepting North Korean citizens) prefers a stable North Korea.
The U.S. and South Korea are nominally allies, but excepting the demilitarized zone they have few shared interests. South Korea is another low-cost, high-quality competitor to U.S. industry.
Three chapters cover specific companies: Hyundai (automobiles), Samsung (just about everything imaginable) and LG (mostly electronics and machines). I found these chapters the slowest, but I was struck by how hard the Korean people are described as working and also struck by the large role of the government in industry: providing funds and picking winners and losers. The U.S. does not profess to operate this way, though how it actually operates is rumored to be different than the professed method. The Korean word chaebol parallels the Japanese word keiretsu, both meaning official government sanction and support for certain large conglomerates. The Korean version started after the Korean War, whereas the Japanese version started 200 years ago. Korea officially abandoned its support of such conglomerates ten years ago, though the conglomerates continue to pressure the government to resume the support.
Korea is wired, via cables and radio waves. By 2000, 9 of 10 Koreans had high-speed internet access, and such access is nearly universal today. Subway commuters watching TV on handheld device is a common sight. Again government intervention is common, in large part responsible for these successes and others in memory chips and wireless phones. On the other hand, the Korean government pushed satellite TV hard, launching in 2005, but never succeeding, in large part because Koreans already had terrific access to content via high-speed internet.
The remainder of the book spoke to Korean culture and predictions for the future. It is a we-focused culture, as opposed to a Western me-focus. In the office that means everyone arrives at work at the same time (early). Everyone eats in the cafeteria. Workers compete to leave the office latest. Every feels pressure to drink alcohol to oblivion. Subordinates are subservient to superiors, rarely offering opinions or feedback. Promotions are largely based on age. Unions are weak. All of this sounds unpleasant to the Western ear, yet there are (at least) two redeeming features. One, they work hard and accomplish a lot. The Korean war ended in 1953, with the country in shambles, and in 57 years Korea has vaulted to the 15th largest economy. Two, the Confucian principles that require subservience to elders also requires elders to take seriously their mentorship roles.
I found the Koreans' obsession with golf humorous. I view gold as Mark Twain did: "A good walk ruined". The sport is seen as prestigious, and a good way to cement business relationships. Successful Korean golfers on the PGA or LPGA are viewed as national heroes. All this in a tiny country where land is scarce.
In much the way the U.S. is a magnet for young workers from Latin America, Korea is a magnet for young workers from Southeast Asia with minimal prospects in the native lands. Korea was nearly homogeneous, and is still largely so, but the influx of non-Koreans brings the same pressures, problems and benefits that immigration yields here.
The book described childhood for some Koreans as unpleasant. Students compete fiercely for the best three schools, as attendance assures membership in an elite social crowd, and as explained above relationships in Korean business are critical to success. The book describes Yoo-bin, a five-year-old girl, as attending a $1,000/month English preschool at age four. At age five she started one-on-one tutoring. Now seven, she attends elementary school during the day and hakwon in the evenings. Every year all high school seniors take the college entrance test on the same day. On that day the non-seniors stay home so as not to distract. Businesses close or shift hours to clear road traffic; airlines re-route planes and the military delays exercises. Taxi drivers provide free rides and parking near the school is outlawed. Nearly 100% of students graduate high school and Korea ranks near the top countries in student achievement. On the other hand, families limit the number of children so as to concentrate their financial resources; Korea is aging rapidly as a result.
As modern as Korea is becoming, many Korean women seem to be stuck in the 50s. When Hillary Clinton visited, during the question-and-answer session with elite female high-school students she was asked about her relationship will Bill and her experiences raising Chelsea and nothing about foreign policy. Women make 64.2 cents for every dollar that a man makes in a similar position.
What can we expect from North Korea, other than the unexpected? Perhaps another war, perhaps started by North Korea with no warning. The most reasonable strategy would be a full-scale push, with the hope of capturing substantially all of South Korean territory before the U.S.-led or -supported troops mobilize. North Korea's Air Force consists of planes from the 1960s operated by airmen with about twenty hours of training (U.S. airmen cannot fly combat missions without 600 hours of in-flight training). The scariest prospect is the North's presumed/estimated possession of six nuclear weapons. And, what would China think, and do? China is interested in stability to its South, first, and no elevation in U.S. power in the region. Hopefully, the U.S. and China have already discussed the issue.
Perhaps the North Korean regime will collapse, as has been predicted since the 1950s. By whatever method (army, intelligence agencies, Korean Workers Party) chaos could very well ensue as Northerners attempt to flee to the South. Southern forces might move into the North to provide stability, but some elements of the North's military forces might object.
Perhaps the countries might peacefully re-unify. Already, the two countries have established a shared industrial zone on the border. More than 30,000 North Koreans work for South Korean managers, earning more than they could in the North, even after the North Korean government takes it cut. For the South, even that wage is considerably less than what would be paid in the South. Is this, then, just cheap immigrant labor?
Or, perhaps nothing will change, with the North behaving erratically and the South paying hush money.
Besides its relationship with the North, one of the South's most pressing issues is energy. It possesses few domestic sources of energy and its manufacturing economy is particularly reliant on cheap energy. Korea currently generates 20% of its electrical needs from nuclear power, not enough of its energy budget to protect against increasing oil costs. The authors urge Korea to devote more resources to wind energy, both for domestic consumption and as a technology to be sold abroad; they are especially enthusiastic about Korea's opportunity here, given its past successes with automobile and electronics manufacturing.
Monday, August 9, 2010
Commitment and corporate goals
I am reading a book about influence. I am enjoying it a lot and will write more thoroughly later, but I was struck by this. I often wonder why employees are asked to set yearly goals. So much can happen between January and December it seems meaningless. I think one reason might be that, by putting a commitment in writing, people are more inclined to meet that commitment. If the goals we employees write on these wretched forms are at all beneficial to the organization, then the organization might benefit from having us write them.
Oracle Database Training
I just finished the second of two days of Oracle Training Days in downtown Denver. In all I was impressed; I attended the following presentations:
Agile Methods and Data Warehousing: How to Deliver Faster, by Kent Graziano. Kent is a good speaker, but he ran long. I found myself nodding my head (in agreement, not sleepiness) often. He reviewed the agile (lowercase "a", in his words) manifesto and how it applies generally to data warehousing. The question he did not answer, and no one has answered, is how one solves the re-factoring problem. Re-factoring Java code, for example, is very easy with the available tools, making the price of change low and therefore the price of early, incomplete delivery low.
Agile Methods and Data Warehousing: How to Deliver Faster, by Kent Graziano. Kent is a good speaker, but he ran long. I found myself nodding my head (in agreement, not sleepiness) often. He reviewed the agile (lowercase "a", in his words) manifesto and how it applies generally to data warehousing. The question he did not answer, and no one has answered, is how one solves the re-factoring problem. Re-factoring Java code, for example, is very easy with the available tools, making the price of change low and therefore the price of early, incomplete delivery low.
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