Book review: A History of the Middle East

With this post I review the book originally authored by Peter Mansfield in 1991 and revised and updated by Nicolas Pelham in 2003 (ISBN 0 14 30.3433 2).

My interest in the Middle East stems from several sources: the seemingly-intractable problems of today; its role in the oil industry (the subject of The Prize by Daniel Yergin); Islam; and the Ottoman empire. One movie I distinctly remember as a child was "Lawrence of Arabia".

My inescapable conclusion: what a mess Britain made! The French tried as hard as the British to make a mess, but were less successful, and so less blameworthy. The U.S. arrived later than the British, with more wisdom (presumably as a result of observing what the British did) and its impact has been close to neutral.

Of course, much of the blame could be directed to Mr. Osman, progenitor of the Ottoman empire in the 1300s. He and his offspring were successful invaders and conquerors and, importantly, relatively wise rulers, collecting taxes and imposing their will and spreading Islam but doing so gently enough to cause the ruled to choose submission rather than fighting to the death. Over time, though, their territory grew too large, their rulers too weak and indulgent, and their empire collapsed towards the end of World War I.

The causes of the Ottoman decline were external and internal. Internally, Bayezid I succeeded his father Murad in 1389, and upon assumption of power he ordered the strangulation of one of his rivals: his brother. The practice of murdering rivals both within the family and without continued with successive rulers, setting up intrigue upon intrigue as mothers tried to preserve the lives of their sons. More damaging, though, was the practice of secluding the heir apparent so that his life could be spared until his turn to assume power. This seclusion had the effect of physically and mentally weakening the one person the empire should turn to.

Externally the British and Portuguese emerged from the Dark Ages with powerful fleets that established bases throughout the Ottoman world. And, whereas earlier Muslim civilizations both contributed to and borrowed from contemporary Christian civilizations, the Turkish Ottomans showed little inclination to share, secure in the knowledge that Muslim ways were superior. And in Egypt, a prize because of its fertile Nile valley and its strategic position straddling the Mediterranean and Red Seas, the Ottomans had struggled with local forces for a long time and then, in 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte viewed Egypt as a counterbalance to British power in India, and although we was ultimately unsuccessful in Egypt, his exploits focused Western attention on Egypt.

The story of Muhammad Ali in Egypt played out similarly to many contested domains. The Ottomans, the Malmuke beys, and Muhammad Ali all struggled for power. The Ottomans decided to cut their losses by naming him as the Ottoman governor. While nominally under the Sultan's direction, he had substantial discretion because of his independent power base. And, in a pattern that was to play out repeatedly by other rulers, he established his power by a combination of ruthlessness and sensibility, using brutal means to suppress dissension but also wise economic policies to maximize the productivity of an already fertile nation. Thus he was able to prevail for some time against the array of uncoordinated forces opposing him: the French, the British, the Russians, and the beys in the countryside.

The Ottoman empire did not consistently, for its six-hundred-plus years of existence, remain fixed in time. Although consistently trailing European technology, Sultan Abdul Mejid I, born in 1839 and ascending to the throne sixteen years later, undertook reforms which substantially changed the empire. The changes included a non-Sharia-based code of law, including the concept of equality before the law of all Ottoman citizens; the opening of new military schools, using foreign instructors; the reduction to five years, from a lifetime, of required military service; and the establishment of a centralized network of primary and secondary schools (to that time, all schools were religious). Unfortunately, these reforms and military expenditures to keep pace with European armaments, were expensive. To meet the empire's financial needs the Sultan expanded trade; while revenues increased, much of the benefit accrued to foreigners; he also issued bonds, increasing inflation.

As trade increased an young Ottomans circulated more, they became aware of their empire's backwardness. They were also none too happy with the continued existence of The Capitulations, policies adopted during the height of the empire's power that, in an effort to stimulate trade and industry, exempted foreigners from taxes and laws. Frustration and embarrassment led many of these young people to organize the first revolutionary bodies.

As the empire weakened forces in Europe, and Russia, saw their opportunity to exert more influence over lands formerly firmly, but now only nominally, under Ottoman rule. Yet, all were careful not to push too far, as are were interested in the buffer and stabilizing force of a weakened, rather than non-existent, empire.

In 1854 the new leader of Egypt, Said, embarked to borrow large sums from European banks to finance the building of the Suez Canal (a waterway from the Mediterranean to the Red Seas). The project was headed by Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps. By 1869 the canal was completed, and by 1875 Egypt, nearly bankrupt from this expenditure (and others, including the laying of train track and telegraph cables), sold its interest in the Canal to Britain. And, Britain borrowed from private banks as well to finance the sale. Colonel Ahmed Arabi of the Egyptian army came to power as the voice of the military and fellahin, Egyptian workers oppressed by the high taxes necessary to make debt payments on the Canal. Britain and France objected and insisted on the return to power of the Ottoman khedive. This position further inflamed Egyptian public opinion; Britain and France sent a fleet sailing down the Mediterranean and posted it outside Alexandria. Riots broke out, resulting in some fifty dead Europeans. The fleet shelled the city, flattening it. British forces landed, killing ten thousand Egyptian soldiers at a cost of 57. Britain, never seriously intending offensive action or occupation, found itself in that position. It ruled nominally, with Lord Cromer "advising" an Ottoman khedive; Britain was most interested in preserving the Suez Canal and the overland links through Egypt and to India. Cromer, following the feelings of many Britons, lever bothered to learn Arabic in his 24 years of service in Egypt. To his credit, though, he engineered the construction of the Aswan damn and oversaw a government that was more effective and less corrupt than the Ottoman one he replaced.

During the 18th and early 19th centuries the Ottoman empire shrank but still covered the "Arab heartland", such as Medina, Mecca, Jerusalem and Baghdad. But its hold varied, and in many places it ruled because it was at the moment barely stronger than any competing power, rather than because it was effective. Abdul Hamid's rule ended in 1908 with the rise of the Committee for Union and Progress ("CUP"), led by Enver Bey, Jemal Pasha and the future Kemal Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal. The CUP, with brutality matching that of the government it deposed, attempted to "Turkify" portions of the Ottoman empire, especially Istanbul, to the bother of Ottoman Arabs.

Contemporaneously with the developments in the Ottoman empire the House of Saud, led by Ibn Saud, fought for control of Arabia with the Nejd, led by Sharif Hussein, who cooperated with the Ottomans when it suited him. The Saudis, following their fierce Wahhabi (Muslim) faith, saw little to admire in the Ottomans and did not cooperate, even where it might have suited them politically or militarily.

Few Westerners are familiar with the differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. The differences are historical and political, not religious, and concern the proper succession from the prophet Muhammad. The Ottomans were Sunnis, and the Persians (Iranians) were Shiites, and they battle for control of Mesopotamia (roughly modern-day Iraq) for two hundred years before the Ottomans secured a fragile victory.

Europeans were also interested in these lands, and Russian wars with Persia generally went in Russia's favor, yielding it land, money, capitulations, and free-trade agreements. In 1907 the British and Russians agreed to partition Persia, in a sense, with Russia's sphere of influence covering the North and center and the British the Southeast. At first glance the British portion was inferior, but owing to a 60-year oil concession the Shah granted to William Knox D'Arcy in 1901. He struck nothing at first, and was about to leave; the British Navy pined for a non-Russian and non-American source of oil, and supported D'Arcy until he struck one of the largest oil fields in the world, in Southeastern Persia in 1908.

With the start of World War I the Ottomans had to choose between neutrality, supporting the Germans, or supporting the Allies. They choose the Germans, which in hindsight was a poor choice. As the Ottomans were falling to the Allies the British and French divided the Middle East into spheres of influence with the Sykes-Picot agreement: to France would go Lebanon and Syria and to England Iraq and Transjordan. The French were interested in protecting Christians in Syria; the British were most concerned with access to India via the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Arabia. The agreement said nothing about Palestine. But, in addition to this agreement was the Balfour declaration, authored by the British foreign secretary:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and ill use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done with may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

At the time Palestine was largely Arab and controlled by the Ottomans; a small Jewish population existed. The declaration encouraged Jewish immigration and over time the population grew in size, influence and power. The Zionists (Jews interested in political power, rather than mere religious freedom) proved more sophisticated, better funded (from Europe and the United States) and more violent than the resident Arabs, leading to their establishment of Israel in 1948. The Balfour declaration has caused, at least in part, ninety years of bloodshed, with perhaps another ninety waiting. In fairness to the British, though, this portion of the world has not enjoyed much peace, at least according to the Bible.

At the conclusion of World War I the Ottoman empire had ceased. What was formerly dominion over much of the Arab world was now present day Turkey, a country more Turk than Arab. The remainder of the former empire consisted of tribes, not nation-states, which explains the difficulties the West has encountered ever since. The United States, under president Wilson, preferred to give native inhabitants more input. Britain and France, having more interests (read: colonies), preferred consulting and advice: a nominal nation-state under the "advice" of a European power. Neither approach seems justified in hindsight, given that no nation-state existed before the Ottomans rose to power 500 years ago. The evaporation of the Ottomans did not, therefore, leave an intact people thankful to be free. It left dozens of tribes and power centers and vested interests that were not amenable to central government, whether that government was directed by natives or Europeans.

The British and France also exercised their influence with the League of Nations to divide what was then known as Syria into French Lebanon, French Syria, British Palestine and British Transjordan; Iraq went to Britain, too. The Arabs fought with bullets against these arrangements but were no match for European planes and tanks.

Just as the British and French jostled for power the Arabs did, too, with Ibn Saud wielding his Wahhabi warriors and capturing the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, though the warriors were too independent to take direct orders and ventured beyond his mandate and incurred heavy losses. The British ended their various subsidies to Arab rulers they no longer had use for.

In Egypt the British ruled, or nearly ruled, over an unruly land they did not want to rule. Britain nevertheless feared the various parties that might fill the vacuum created if they were to leave. The British authorities on the ground therefore backed whatever Egyptian leader seemed most capable and most compliant, not necessarily in that order. Their continued presence, however, continued to irritate the citizens and was routinely used by politicians not in power to criticize those who were.

The first oil in commercial quantities was discovered in Iran; later, oil was found in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. at this time, producing more oil than it could use from wells in Pennsylvania, Texas and California, pursued a largely isolationist strategy, with the exception of insisting on the right of any party (especially American) to bid on shares of concessions. These concessions generally called for an up-front payment by the developed country to the undeveloped country, with continuing payments based on the amount of oil extracted and its price. The Arab and Persian countries at this time were desperately poor and lacked the technical acumen to extract and refine the oil themselves. Over the years, as the price of oil increased, the oil countries insisted on larger and larger portions of the profits, until at varying times they simply seized the equipment and booted the Western interests.

With the outbreak of World War II both Iran and Egypt were pressured to take sides. Neither had strong sympathies in either direction, and at the start of the war the relative strength of the fighters was unknown. Both, therefore, took moderate approaches, although both generally fell on the side of the Allies, the Allies were able to push Axis forces from Egypt and Iran just before the Axis powers seized those areas in their entirety. Russia and Britain took spheres of interest in Iran.

At the conclusion of World War II Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and Syria agitated for independence. This was fine with the British but not the French, who arrested the winners of elections and bombed Damascus when violence erupted. The French eventually capitulated in 1946, and Syria and Lebanon joined the United Nations.

From that time the nations with substantial Arab or Muslim populations, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc., now substantially freed from Western domination, struggled to define themselves. Were they Arabs with a shared religion or Muslims with shared geography? The conflicts between the Wahhabi and Hashemite, and between Sunni and Shi'a, have meant that even with the Arab League and OPEC and various other organizations designed to promote unity, these nations do not speak with one voice, any more than the United States and France, though close allies, speak as one. And indeed, a substantial source of conflict in these Middle Eastern countries arises when the secularists in power do not seem sufficiently attentive to the religious elements in the population. The reverse of this situation exists in Iran, where religious elements hold control and the population, who consider themselves more Western than Arab, regret the constrictions on their lives. One irony is that Ayatollah Khomeini's most serious opposition when he seized power in 1979 sprung not from the population, who probably support any type of Iranian victory over the megalomaniacal Shah, but from religious clerics who questioned his spiritual authority

The out-sized personality of Saddam Hussein must figure prominently in any account of Middle Eastern history. With the Iranian revolution, Iran's broadcast of pro-Shi'a messages into Iragi airwaves, alarmed Hussein. Hussein decided to act first, deciding that although Iran was larger and more heavily-resourced, a surprise move could be successful against the demoralized Iranian military. And, he was initially successful militarily and politically. His forces pushed deep into Iran while most Arab states quietly supported him with statements and materials. But, Iran eventually gained the upper hand, pushed Iraq's forces back, and the war ended eight years later after many deaths and hardly any change in borders.

While Arab sentiment during this war was directed more against Iran than in favor of Hussein, he misunderstood that dynamic and shortly after the conclusion of that war announced Kuwait would "rejoin its mother" by becoming the 19th Iraqi province. Never mind that Kuwait existed two centuries before Iraq's birth as a British governmental convenience. World opinion, led by the first President Bush, formed against him, and his forces were routed as they fled Kuwait, but not before they inflicted grotesque damages to Kuwaiti oilfields, souring the environment for months.

America's success in Kuwait and the implosion of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s left the United States as the unquestioned Superpower, and it used that power, and helped establish that power, but creating semi-permanent military installations in Kuwait; by monitoring, for years, no-fly zones over large portions of Iraq; by enforcing the oil-for-food program; and by sponsoring and prodding UNSCOM to search for weapons of mass destruction inside Iraq. There were limits, however. Despite the first President Bush's outspoken desire for regime change in Iraq, when Shiites and Kurds did rise the United States provided no material support, and Hussein brutally suppressed them.

It was the Iraqi people who suffered when Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with the U.S.-led coalition on the oil-for-food program. During this time Hussein had the audacity to allow Iraqi TV to broadcast images from his birthday party to the Iraqi population, including his cutting of the cake, at a time when most Iraqis had not seen sugar in months. Unfortunately for the U.S., most Arab countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, took a dim view of the U.S.-led embargo, and quietly but determinedly established their own relationships with Iraq. At the same time, public opinion of the U.S. in these countries dropped, fueled by the suffering and the indulgence the U.S. showed Israel as it, too, ignored those U.N. resolutions it disagreed with.

In 1993 the Israeli Labour Party took power and its leader, Yitzhak Rabin, reached out to Yasser Arafat. After months of negotiations hosted by Norway, the Oslo accords announced a seismic shift: Israel would give back territory it had won in previous wars and the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist. The trades were to be consummated years in the future. By 1995 most of the world had accepted the agreement. Rabin's Israeli assassin did not, however. His actions encouraged extremist Jews to murder Muslims and for Hamas to terrorize Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and for the spiral of millenia of violence to continue. To this day the momentum from the Oslo accords has not been regained.

One cannot judge certain cultures as being superior to others, but in one sphere the Arab world lags the Western: democracy. Much of the Arab world is on its second or third generation of kings, sons or grandsons of the original rulers from the post World War I or II periods. Unlike the earliest generation these men have grown up in luxury and with education, but see it as necessary they rule their countries with an iron fist. In what has been an alliance of questionable morality, the U.S. can count on these leaders to speak against revolutionary activity in any country for fear the same will happen in the ones they rule.

Finally, author Pelham turns to the current day. He writes, and I have felt for some time, that so-called Muslim extremists are not Muslims. They are extremists who use Islam as a coordinating and rallying force. The Koran (of which I have read two-thirds) has small sections advocating violence, but it focuses on instruction for God-fearing and neighborly living. The Old Testament is extremely violent, and the New Testament somewhat aggressive. The Israeli student who murdered Yitzhak Rabin and spurred a cycle of violence that has killed hundreds and make homeless thousands declared himself a Jew. That man was no more a Jew than Osama Bin Laden is a Muslim.