My annual review is approaching. While the feedback will help with my growth, I dislike most of the process: the corporate heavy-handedness and ineptness, the time, and my own competitiveness.
On the corporate side, one story should illustrate the sad irony. Employees are rated on a five-point scale, with 5 as outstanding. Most people receive a 3. That makes sense: on average, people are average. However, it is well understood that, on average, most people think of themselves as above average. So, for most people, receiving a rating of 3 is unpleasant. My suggestion: make the average rating a 4, or 3.5; something higher than 3. Few people share information about their rating, their raise or their bonus with colleagues. Thus, no one will know that their own rating of 3.5 is in fact merely average. Instead, most people will be happy to receive their artificially-inflated rating.
The management solution: this year, the average rating will fall between 2 and 3.
On my side, I want to be viewed as highly competent and effective. I derive a lot of self-esteem from positive feedback. I wish that were not the case. A higher rating yields a better raise and bonus, but I already make enough money to feed, house, and clothe my family. We vacation somewhere every year. More money will not make us happier.
My employer is 100% owned by a mutual insurance company. So, in a vague sense, I work for a non-profit organization. Still, my employer is not saving the world. So, as much as I would say that my competitiveness is directed to making the world a better place, that is not true.
Saturday, October 30, 2010
Friday, October 29, 2010
Book review: Blood, Sweat and Chalk
Authoed by Tim Layden of Sports Illustrated (2010, 978-1-60320-061-5). The subtitle is "The Ultimate Football Playbook". The sub-subtitle is "How the Great Coaches Built Today's Game".
As an aside, it seems most books today use a subtitle. This one is the first I have seen to use a sub-subtitle, but I suppose it will become more common.
I really like NFL football for a number of reasons. First, I don't like NHL hockey: the players hold too much, fight too much, and score too little. Second, unlike baseball and basketball, the entire league is mostly competitive; any team can win on a given Sunday. Third, it is a team game, and organizing eleven players for any one play, and having them coordinate their work, intrigues me. I once worked with a guy who played NCAA Division II football. He explained to me that the game is not won or lost on Sunday, but it largely determined by the game planning that occurs in the week leading to the game. Fourth, the ball isn't round, which adds an element of luck to key plays.
The book is written in typical Sports Illustrated style: breezy and upbeat. Every team has a fan, and the writer is careful not to insult the reader. Every team has a chance, every player has a good story or an opportunity for redemption. The style is enjoyable upon a first read but wears on me after that. We received a free subscription to Sports Illustrated by exchanging miles on a airline that we seldom fly. (In truth, we seldom fly, period.) The year is coming to a close, the re-up price is a bargain at $20, and yet I am not sure that I will.
The book describes 22 packages, most of them offense, including the ones that I knew or at least heard of:
* Single wing.
* Wildcat. Seemingly introduced in 2009 by the Miami Dolphins, but born in 1990.
* Wishbone. Originating in the 1960s, and mostly used at the college level, it fell out of favor because the quarterback was running more and throwing less, not a good preparation for the NFL. The better high-school quarterback prospects avoided such schools.
* West coast offense. Bill Walsh developed the system after his gifted quarterback with a strong arm injured himself. The replacement quarterback could not throw the ball more than twenty yards. The alternative was short passes to receivers running full speed across the field. The San Francisco 49ers of the 1980s, with Jerry Rice, perfected it, after Walsh developed it with the Cincinnati Bengals.
* Power sweep. Vince Lombardi, 1950s, Green Bay Packers. Not a complicated play, but practiced to perfection by good athletes.
* Zone blocking. Born in the 1960s, used by various teams. The offensive line moves as a unit slightly left or slightly right. The gaps between the defensive players become larger as a result, yielding a cutback lane for the runner.
* Spread offense. Dutch Meyer in the 1930s and 1940s was the first to employ what should have been an obvious concept: use the whole field.
* No-huddle. Born in 1958 with the Baltimore Colts and Johnny Unitas. Perhaps perfected by the 1980s Cincinnati Bengals, coached by Sam Wyche, quarterbacked by Boomer Esiason. Peyton Manning and the Indianapolis Colts have had pretty good success with it, too, and many teams use it at least on occasion.
On the defensive side the book describes the following formations that I knew or at least heard of:
* Cover two. Also known as "Tampa Two", perfected by the Pittsburgh Steelers in the 70s. The safeties split the field, the cornerbacks play up tight, and fast linebackers patrol the area between the safeties and the corners.
* 46. Buddy Ryan, 1980s Chicago Bears. Haphazardly named for strong safety Doug Plank, who wore number 46. The system overloaded part of the line with the purpose of stopping the run and forcing the quarterback to throw before he was ready. It also relied on superior defensive athleticism. The Bears won the Superbowl by holding the New England Patriots to 10 points. The Bears total: 46.
* Zone blitz. Originated with the Miami Dolphins in the 1970s and perfected by the Steelers in this decade. Relies on athletic linemen who can guard a running back, freeing the linebackers to blitz the quarterback from unexpected and unpredictable angles.
* Double-A gap blitz. Developed by Jim Johnson of the Eagles in this decade, it puts two linebackers over the center. They may, or may not blitz, but the offense has to account for that possibility, and the linebacker(s) or defensive end can often attack the quarterback unblocked. Steve Spagnuolo was Mr. Johnson's assistant and brought the defense with him to the N.Y. Giants, who rode that defense (and four superior defensive linemen) to victory over the previously unbeaten New England Patriots in 2007.
I found amusing and fun the description of the A-11: all eleven players wear numbers making them eligible receiver. By formation, the five linemen cannot catch a pass, but the defense does not know who those five are until the last moment. And, while a lineman cannot catch a pass, there is no rule saying a lineman, after receiving a hand-off or lateral, cannot throw a pass!
Each chapter includes a picture with X's and O's, and description of the history and which coaches and players were involved, and how each was an evolution or twist on a previous strategy. Football coaches apparently talk to each other quite a bit and freely share strategy (at least after the season). Most are united in a love of the game and the strategy behind it. When a football announcer today breathlessly describes a new strategy, most football coaches would respond by noting that the strategy is not new, it is merely a repacking of an old approach.
As an aside, it seems most books today use a subtitle. This one is the first I have seen to use a sub-subtitle, but I suppose it will become more common.
I really like NFL football for a number of reasons. First, I don't like NHL hockey: the players hold too much, fight too much, and score too little. Second, unlike baseball and basketball, the entire league is mostly competitive; any team can win on a given Sunday. Third, it is a team game, and organizing eleven players for any one play, and having them coordinate their work, intrigues me. I once worked with a guy who played NCAA Division II football. He explained to me that the game is not won or lost on Sunday, but it largely determined by the game planning that occurs in the week leading to the game. Fourth, the ball isn't round, which adds an element of luck to key plays.
The book is written in typical Sports Illustrated style: breezy and upbeat. Every team has a fan, and the writer is careful not to insult the reader. Every team has a chance, every player has a good story or an opportunity for redemption. The style is enjoyable upon a first read but wears on me after that. We received a free subscription to Sports Illustrated by exchanging miles on a airline that we seldom fly. (In truth, we seldom fly, period.) The year is coming to a close, the re-up price is a bargain at $20, and yet I am not sure that I will.
The book describes 22 packages, most of them offense, including the ones that I knew or at least heard of:
* Single wing.
* Wildcat. Seemingly introduced in 2009 by the Miami Dolphins, but born in 1990.
* Wishbone. Originating in the 1960s, and mostly used at the college level, it fell out of favor because the quarterback was running more and throwing less, not a good preparation for the NFL. The better high-school quarterback prospects avoided such schools.
* West coast offense. Bill Walsh developed the system after his gifted quarterback with a strong arm injured himself. The replacement quarterback could not throw the ball more than twenty yards. The alternative was short passes to receivers running full speed across the field. The San Francisco 49ers of the 1980s, with Jerry Rice, perfected it, after Walsh developed it with the Cincinnati Bengals.
* Power sweep. Vince Lombardi, 1950s, Green Bay Packers. Not a complicated play, but practiced to perfection by good athletes.
* Zone blocking. Born in the 1960s, used by various teams. The offensive line moves as a unit slightly left or slightly right. The gaps between the defensive players become larger as a result, yielding a cutback lane for the runner.
* Spread offense. Dutch Meyer in the 1930s and 1940s was the first to employ what should have been an obvious concept: use the whole field.
* No-huddle. Born in 1958 with the Baltimore Colts and Johnny Unitas. Perhaps perfected by the 1980s Cincinnati Bengals, coached by Sam Wyche, quarterbacked by Boomer Esiason. Peyton Manning and the Indianapolis Colts have had pretty good success with it, too, and many teams use it at least on occasion.
On the defensive side the book describes the following formations that I knew or at least heard of:
* Cover two. Also known as "Tampa Two", perfected by the Pittsburgh Steelers in the 70s. The safeties split the field, the cornerbacks play up tight, and fast linebackers patrol the area between the safeties and the corners.
* 46. Buddy Ryan, 1980s Chicago Bears. Haphazardly named for strong safety Doug Plank, who wore number 46. The system overloaded part of the line with the purpose of stopping the run and forcing the quarterback to throw before he was ready. It also relied on superior defensive athleticism. The Bears won the Superbowl by holding the New England Patriots to 10 points. The Bears total: 46.
* Zone blitz. Originated with the Miami Dolphins in the 1970s and perfected by the Steelers in this decade. Relies on athletic linemen who can guard a running back, freeing the linebackers to blitz the quarterback from unexpected and unpredictable angles.
* Double-A gap blitz. Developed by Jim Johnson of the Eagles in this decade, it puts two linebackers over the center. They may, or may not blitz, but the offense has to account for that possibility, and the linebacker(s) or defensive end can often attack the quarterback unblocked. Steve Spagnuolo was Mr. Johnson's assistant and brought the defense with him to the N.Y. Giants, who rode that defense (and four superior defensive linemen) to victory over the previously unbeaten New England Patriots in 2007.
I found amusing and fun the description of the A-11: all eleven players wear numbers making them eligible receiver. By formation, the five linemen cannot catch a pass, but the defense does not know who those five are until the last moment. And, while a lineman cannot catch a pass, there is no rule saying a lineman, after receiving a hand-off or lateral, cannot throw a pass!
Each chapter includes a picture with X's and O's, and description of the history and which coaches and players were involved, and how each was an evolution or twist on a previous strategy. Football coaches apparently talk to each other quite a bit and freely share strategy (at least after the season). Most are united in a love of the game and the strategy behind it. When a football announcer today breathlessly describes a new strategy, most football coaches would respond by noting that the strategy is not new, it is merely a repacking of an old approach.
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