Mr. Massie narrates the story of South Africa from the time of the Dutch landing to the present day. The treatment of the natives was, of course, horrific. One is incredulous to think that humans can treat each other this way. I was sickened to read of the violence visited on innocent children by Hendrick Verwoerd, John Vorster and P.W. Botha; amazed at what was simply a murder campaign by the South African government against non-whites; I was saddened to read of black-on-black violence between those who wanted urgent action against apartheid and those who advocated a cautious and conciliatory approach. It was not until the ascension of F.W. de Klerk did South Africa move to end apartheid and join free-thinking people. It was ironic that F.W. de Klerk, widely regarded as conservative and elected by whites on that basis, upon taking office revealed his willingness to negotiate with "the enemy", in much the same way that only Nixon could go to China.
The book starts with the following paragraph:
On June 6, 1966, the Democratic senator from the state of New York, Robert F. Kennedy, stood in front of several hundred white students at the University of Cape Town, South Aftrica. "I come here today because of my deep interest in and affection for a land settled by the Dutch in the seventeenth centry," he began, "a land taken over by the British, and at last independent; a land in which the native inhabitants were at first subdued and relations with whom are a problem to this day; a land which defined itself on a hostile frontier; a land to which was once an importer of slaves and now must struggle to wipe out the last traces of that form of bondage," Kennedy paused briefly for effect. "I refer, of course," he said, "to the United States of America."
President Reagan does not come out well. I was fourteen years of age when Reagan became president. I remember him as aloof and not much for thinking. In this book he is all of that and mean-spirited and willfully blind to the injustices blacks suffered under South African Apartheid.
Carter comes out slightly better. His heart was in the right place, but he did not lead forcefully, accomplished little, and stayed in office only four years.
A few themes struck me. First, I was greatly impressed by Desmond Tutu. His contribution was his voice, resonant and eloquent. He was well known throughout the world, such that the South African government could not curtail his movements without risking condemnation. He traveled widely internationally, speaking against apartheid, mocking the government and its self-contradictory positions. He also traveled through South African, risking his life by calling for halts to black-on-black violence. He chaired the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was formed after the ANC's assumption of government control. The Commission granted amnesty for any actions that the confessor admitted to.
Second, I was even more impressed by Nelson Mandela. A founding member of the African National Congress (ANC), Mandela was born to an African chief in 1918 and was shepherding sheep and goats. Nelson's father died when he was nine and another chief adopted him. From that chief he learned "a leader is like a shepherd. He stays behind the flock, letting the most nimble go out ahead, whereupon all the others follow, not realizing that all along they are being directed from behind." Mandela played both roles, first as a "most nimble" when he led the ANC, later directing from behind when, after his release from prison, he advocated reconciliation with the former white task masters.
The South African government portrayed the ANC as a hotbed of communist agitation, and in truth there were some communist elements. The ANC and communist groups formed various alignments and broke them throughout the years as they either highlighted their common interests (the fate of laborers, for example) or their differences (most ANC leaders were distrustful of Russia). At his trial in 1962 Mandela cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, argued that the trial was about broader issues, and refused to plea for leniency. The judge sentenced him to five years, and the government, fearing his skills and determination and using various "legal" manipulations, held him on Robben island in a concrete cell with a bucket toilet for those five and an additional 22.
Martin Luther King, Jr. had often been asked to wait for justice, and he refused. Mandela waited, meeting secretly with F.W. de Klerk for a year, after de Klerk had been elected president, to work out a power-sharing arrangement; the arrangement was not written nor detailed, but rather a statement of principles. De Klerk sensed that an outright handover of power would spur massive violence both by and against the police, military and white citizens. At his first post-release press conference Mandela stated, "Whites are fellow South Africans and we want them to feel safe". At the same time, Mandela calmly and firmly called for the world to continue and increase its sanctions against South Africa.
Mandela was a candidate in the elections that followed two years later and won 63% of the vote. He appointed, per that agreement, to his cabinet members of those political parties that achieved more than 5% of the vote, including de Klerk himself as deputy president. It is remarkable that de Klerk, an elected president, would arrange for some other man, a black no less, to assume the presidency and report to that new leader. He and Mandela shared the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize.
Note that with the foregoing paragraph I do not say that King was mistaken for refusing to wait nor that Mandela was mistaken for waiting. Indeed, one of the most interesting struggles for me personally is the proper treatment of the poor in the United States. Certain liberal leaders push a hard-left agenda, and certain leaders push a moderate agenda, and it is hard to predict which would be most successful in helping the largest number of people both earlier and later.
These changes from the 1990 release of Mandela to his 1993 ascension to power seemed sudden, and it was, but the genesis was born a generation earlier by tiny steps. Mr. Massie details, over hundreds of pages, the divestment movement that eventually so weakened South Africa's white business community that a leader like de Klerk was able to push forward his reforms.
The U.S. government became active only near the end. From the 1960s to the late 1980s the position of the U.S., as measured by actions rather than words, was to support South Africa as a bulwark against communist aggression, with an occasional wringing-of-hands and fretting and hoping regarding South Africa's racial policies.
Individuals had more success, eventually. It started with the smallest of actions. For example, a church group is offended by a large bank that loans money to South Africa. The group writes the the bank president asking that the bank cease such activities. The bank president responds by saying that banks are not in the business of politics and that they will lend to whomever will repay. The church group withdraws its one or ten or hundred thousand dollars from a bank with billions in assets. Maybe some students join them. The episode irritates and slightly embarrasses the bank and the agitators are regretful but resolute.
As another example, an activist buys a share of General Motors stock, attends the annual stockholders meeting, proposes that GM cease doing business in South Africa, and garners 0.01% of the proxies.
These initial efforts had no effect, but they grew. South Africa's most valuable export was gold, and when the world price of that commodity increased it was more immune, but when it fell it was more vulnerable. A troy ounce of gold fetched between $30 and $40 in 1970, rocketed to $600+ in 1980, but fell again to about $400 by 1990, when divestment efforts reached their peak. The first real crack in the wall occurred when institutional investors, such as TIAA-CREF, who were persuaded that it would be permissible for them to consider something other than pure returns when deciding where to invest and, further, that the risks inherent in South African meant perhaps the better investment strategy was to stay our. The retirement fund organizations were followed by other institutions such as colleges, local governments, and the State of New York. At the same time, the shareholder resolutions started to embarrass corporations even though they seldom attracted more than 1% of the shareholder vote; executives agreed to study the problem, then to implement reforms at their South African work facilities and report on their activities, and finally, in the latest stages, to cease doing business in South Africa when the increasing violence there and increasing questions at home made continuing a bad business decision, never mind the moral aspects.
Much of the events described in this book occurred when I was a teenager or young adult. I vaguely remember shantytowns erected on my college campus in support of the ANC. Other than that, I remember little, which is remarkable given the power of the story. I am very glad I read this book.
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